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Fred Zacharias was an accomplished scholar who authored over fifty
law review articles in an academic career spanning thirty years at
Cornell and the University of San Diego law schools. A leader in the
field of professional responsibility, Zacharias unapologetically promoted
the view that lawyers have important professional obligations beyond
simply advancing the interests of their clients, including obligations to
the court, the legal system, and the public. Having served as chair of the
American Association of Law Schools Professional Responsibility
Section, as editor and frequent contributor to its newsletter, and as a
consultant to the American Law Institute’s Restatement of the Law
Governing Lawyers, Zacharias was one of the leading modern scholars
in the field of legal ethics and certainly one of the most cited. Perhaps
his greatest intellectual contribution to the discourse about attorney
conduct lays in his work in my own field—the subspecialty of
prosecutorial ethics. Zacharias was a regular commentator on the use
and abuse of prosecutorial power and frequently lamented that courts,
rules drafters, and disciplinary boards have done very little to curtail
prosecutorial misconduct. Zacharias penned seventeen law review
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articles on the subject of prosecutorial ethics, nine of them coauthored
with Professor Bruce Green of Fordham Law School.
Academics frequently walk in the footsteps of the giants who preceded
them. I certainly have felt Fred Zacharias’s enormous influence in my own
career—especially, but not exclusively, with respect to his many
contributions in the field of prosecutorial ethics. I always learned
something new whenever I read one of Zacharias’s articles, even when I
disagreed with him. His opinions challenged me to question and rethink
my own, and his research opened up new vistas of inquiry for me.
I was first “introduced” to Fred Zacharias (virtually) in 1992 when I
read his important early work Structuring the Ethics of Prosecutorial
Trial Practice: Can Prosecutors Do Justice?1 A prosecutor at the time,
I was deeply interested in legal ethics and responsible for the
professional training of lawyers within my office. That article struck me
then, as it does now, as a watershed work. Zacharias was not
comfortable construing a prosecutor’s obligation as a “minister of
justice”2 as a mere hortatory ideal, devoid of any moral content or
direction. This “special prosecutorial duty is worded so vaguely that it
obviously requires further explanation,” yet ethics codes “provide
remarkably little guidance on its meaning.”3 Zacharias’s 1991
Vanderbilt article began to put some much-needed flesh on the “dojustice” bones, a project that he continued for the next two decades.
Zacharias recognized that the Model Rules of Professional Conduct
“do not exempt prosecutors from the [basic] requirement[] of zealous
advocacy” on behalf of their client—the state.4 But at the trial stage of
criminal proceedings, a prosecutor also has a duty to ensure that the
basic elements of a fully adversarial system exist, which Zacharias
identified as (1) attorneys who are competent, (2) attorneys who possess
a similar level of resources and information, and (3) a tribunal that is
neutral.5 These are the essential premises upon which our adversarial
system is based. The only way that prosecutors can both do justice and
still act as aggressive advocates at trial is if they take an adversarial
view of justice rather than an outcome-oriented view.6 “The paradigm
1. Fred C. Zacharias, Structuring the Ethics of Prosecutorial Trial Practice: Can
Prosecutors Do Justice?, 44 VAND. L. REV. 45 (1991).
2. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.8 cmt. 1 (2010).
3. Zacharias, supra note 1, at 46; see also Fred C. Zacharias & Bruce A. Green,
The Duty To Avoid Wrongful Convictions: A Thought Experiment in the Regulation of
Prosecutors, 89 B.U. L. REV. 1, 13 (2009) (“Language in the codes exhorting prosecutors
to serve justice has been similarly ignored, largely because of the codes’ failure to define the
meaning of ‘justice.’”).
4. Zacharias, supra note 1, at 52.
5. See id. at 61.
6. See id. at 53.

94

[VOL. 48: 93, 2011]

Some Reflections
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

of the prosecutor as an unaligned ‘minister of the system’ makes sense in
the trial context only if it targets situations in which competitive factfinding will not produce results that are ‘acceptable’ within the meaning
of the adversary system.”7 When the adversarial process breaks down at
trial in any significant respect, the code can “no longer expect
competition to achieve adversarially appropriate results.”8 Zacharias
concluded that when any one of these three building blocks is absent,
“prosecutors must help reestablish the essential adversarial balance that
is missing.”9 The remainder of Zacharias’s 1991 article goes on to
explore in probing detail exactly how prosecutors might correct an
adversarial imbalance at trial in certain situations without disserving the
state’s other important interests.10
The disciplinary codes ask prosecutors to be conscious at all times of a
“dual, somewhat schizophrenic”11 responsibility; that is, they must act
simultaneously as “player and referee,”12 zealous advocate and minister
of justice. What Zacharias recognized in 1991—and indeed emphasized
throughout his writing career—was that prosecutors are uniquely situated
among legal advocates to seek “justice” because they are “unencumbered
by [formal] client ties.”13 Zacharias perceived a prosecutor’s representation
of the state as a form of “multirepresentation” of several constituencies
simultaneously.14 A prosecutor must consider the victim’s interest in
retribution, the community’s interest in deterrence and public safety, the
defendant’s entitlement to a fair process, and the system’s need for
efficient resolution of disputes.15 Viewing a prosecutor as having
constituencies rather than clients helps emphasize the importance of
contextualized decisionmaking, in contrast to a purer agency model
where lawyers identify their clients’ interests and then pursue those
interests zealously within the bounds of the law.16 Because the
prosecutor represents various constituencies whose interests might at
times diverge, it is essential to seek some method of ordering priorities.

7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.

Id. at 60.
Id. at 61.
Id. at 62.
Id. at 65–102.
Id. at 107.
Id. at 110.
Id. at 60.
Id. at 57.
Id.
See R. MICHAEL CASSIDY, PROSECUTORIAL ETHICS 5–6 (2005).
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It is on these occasions that the do-justice mandate, while admittedly
vague, serves to highlight for prosecutors the importance of a thoughtful,
careful, and nuanced balancing of interests. So-called integrity rules,
such as the do-justice exhortation in comment 1 to rule 3.8, serve as
reminders to prosecutors about the limits of their adversarial role.17
I have been thinking recently about Zacharias’s “procedural
fairness”18 concept with respect to research I am doing on plea
bargaining. Maintaining a fair process might work as a touchstone for
justice at the trial stage of criminal proceedings, where the adversarial
system is perhaps closest to a real competition. Making sure the deck is
fairly stacked seems like a laudable and indeed necessary goal if we
hope for trials to produce an acceptable result—a result that is as likely
as humanly possible to be accurate and a result that will be respected by
both the participants and the community. But between ninety and
ninety-five percent of criminal charges are resolved by plea bargain
rather than by trial. 19 Whether one views a plea bargain as a
“compromise” 20 for efficiency sake or as a “contract,”21 the model of
procedural fairness Zacharias constructed in 1991 does not accurately
capture a prosecutor’s primary ethical concerns because at the plea
bargaining stage of a criminal case the facts and legal outcomes are
bargained for rather than contested, and no neutral fact finder is deciding
the case. So if procedural fairness cannot be an adequate guidepost for
justice during plea bargaining, what can we substitute in its place?
Given the pervasiveness of plea bargaining in the criminal justice
system, it may seem startling at first blush that the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct and the disciplinary rules in effect in most states
have so little to say about it. Model Rule 3.8, entitled “Special
Responsibilities of a Prosecutor,” is silent on the subject.22 Admittedly,
there are other disciplinary rules—applicable to lawyers in all aspects of
their work—that constrain a prosecutor’s conduct during plea bargaining.
For example, the prohibition in Model Rule 8.4 of dishonesty or
misrepresentation would prohibit a prosecutor from falsely characterizing
the facts or available evidence in order to induce a defendant to plead

17.
18.
19.

Fred C. Zacharias, Integrity Ethics, 22 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 541, 559 (2009).
Zacharias, supra note 1, at 62.
See GEORGE FISHER, PLEA BARGAINING’S TRIUMPH: A HISTORY OF PLEA
BARGAINING IN AMERICA 223 tbl.9.1 (2003); Laura I. Appleman, The Plea Jury, 85 IND.
L.J. 731, 732 (2010).
20. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Plea Bargaining as Compromise, 101 YALE L.J.
1969, 1975–77 (1992).
21. See Robert E. Scott & William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as Contract, 101
YALE L.J. 1909, 1909 (1992).
22. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.8 (2010).
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guilty.23 The requirement of candor to the tribunal in Model Rule
3.3(a)(1) would prohibit a prosecutor from making false statements to
the court in order to induce the court to accept a bargained-for change of
plea, such as misstating or minimizing the defendant’s prior criminal
record in order to obtain a favorable sentence, or misstating the evidence
in order to satisfy the elements of an offense other than the one
originally charged in the indictment.24 Model Rule 3.4(f), prohibiting an
attorney from requesting a person other than a client or relative or
employee of a client to refrain from giving relevant information to
another party, would preclude a prosecutor from entering into a plea
agreement with a defendant in a multiple-party case on the condition that
the defendant refuse to testify on behalf of or cooperate with a
codefendant.25 But that is essentially it. Aside from those general
proscriptions, a prosecutor’s conduct during plea negotiations is pretty
much unregulated as a professional matter except by the do-justice
admonition.
Why do the disciplinary rules take such a “hands-off” approach to plea
bargaining? The courts tend to look to contract principles to ascertain
the legitimacy and enforceability of plea agreements.26 Both sides
achieve an advantage by resolving matters short of trial. The
prosecution conserves government resources and avoids the privacy,
safety, and other concerns that may be raised by calling victims and
other civilian witnesses to the stand. The defendant avoids the
uncertainties of litigation, achieves a more prompt resolution of the
dispute than the defendant otherwise would, minimizes the public
spectacle and embarrassment that may flow from a public airing of the
charges, and often reduces the defendant’s exposure to punishment
through either charge bargaining or an agreed or capped sentencing
recommendation. It is this mutuality of advantage that causes courts to
look at plea bargaining through the lens of contract: both sides are giving
something up, and both sides are getting something in return. Due to the
prevailing contract framework, a defendant’s waiver of certain statutory
and constitutional rights in a plea agreement will be enforced after

23. Id. R. 8.4.
24. Id. R. 3.3(a)(1).
25. See also id. R. 3.4(a) (“A lawyer shall not . . . unlawfully obstruct another party’s
access to evidence . . . .”).
26. See, e.g., Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 363 (1978); Santobello v.
New York, 404 U.S. 257, 263 (1971).
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conviction and imposition of sentence if they are entered into voluntarily
and knowingly.27 In any given case, there may be power inequities and
imbalances in incentives and information between the prosecution and
the defense. For example, the defendant may have a stronger incentive
to plead guilty if the defendant is otherwise facing a harsh mandatory
sentence; the prosecution may have a stronger incentive to recommend a
lenient sentence if its evidence is weak or it needs the defendant to
cooperate in the prosecution of others. But absent unconscionability or
adhesion, an imbalance of bargaining power alone typically will not be
considered sufficient grounds to decline to enforce a contract.28
Bar disciplinary authorities, and by extension the state supreme courts
that authorize and supervise them, appear to be uninterested in regulating
plea bargaining for reasons very similar to the nonchalant approach that
they take to enforcement of rule 3.8(d), which requires prosecutors to
disclose exculpatory evidence.29 That is, they assume that contract
principles, coupled with a trial court’s obligation to conduct a plea
colloquy that ensures both that there is a factual basis for the plea and
that the defendant’s relinquishment of rights is voluntary and informed,30
will be sufficient to curtail prosecutorial misconduct, just as those courts
assume that the constitutional disclosure obligations under Brady v.
Maryland 31 and local rules of criminal procedure will be adequate to
police a prosecutor’s discovery obligations.32 With these safeguards in
place, why should we seek consensus around what it means to seek
justice in the plea bargaining context?
Zacharias’s 1998 article, Justice in Plea Bargaining, made a compelling
case for the vitality of the do-justice obligation, even at the plea
bargaining stage of criminal cases.33 If one accepts the premise that the
27. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 747 (1970). Although some circuits will
refuse to enforce a defendant’s waiver in a plea agreement if such a waiver would result
in a “miscarriage of justice,” see, e.g., United States v. Burns, 409 F.3d 994, 996 (8th
Cir. 2005); United States v. Teeter, 257 F.3d 14, 26 (1st Cir. 2001), this safety valve is
not dissimilar to a court’s common law ability to refuse to enforce the terms of a contract
if it would violate public policy. See Richard A. Epstein, In Defense of the Contract at
Will, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 947, 954–55 (1984).
28. See Daniel D. Barnhizer, Inequality of Bargaining Power, 76 U. COLO. L. REV.
139, 144 (2005).
29. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.8(d) (2010).
30. See, e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b)(1)–(2); see also Brady, 397 U.S. at 748.
31. 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) (“[T]he suppression by the prosecution of evidence
favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material
either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.”).
32. See Richard A. Rosen, Disciplinary Sanctions Against Prosecutors for Brady
Violations: A Paper Tiger, 65 N.C. L. REV. 693, 732–34 (1987); Fred C. Zacharias, The
Professional Discipline of Prosecutors, 79 N.C. L. REV. 721, 760 (2001).
33. See generally Fred C. Zacharias, Justice in Plea Bargaining, 39 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 1121 (1998).
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overriding goals of the criminal justice system are to punish the guilty
and protect the innocent, it is an undesired result if an innocent
defendant pleads guilty to a crime that the defendant did not commit.
Zacharias recognized several reasons why this happens and why legal
ethicists should be concerned about it. First, there may be an imperfect
flow of information from the prosecution to the defense, leading the
defendant to believe that the government’s case is stronger than it is.34
Second, the defense attorney might be communicating poorly with the
client or otherwise providing inadequate representation due to the
presence of factors such as an overwhelming caseload, insufficient
investigatory resources, laziness, or a desire to curry favor with the
government.35 The defense attorney could also be laboring under an
undisclosed conflict of interest.36 Any of these forms of agency cost37
might lead to an inaccurate guilty plea. The defendant might be
dissatisfied with the services of the lawyer but not in a position
economically to hire a new one.38 Finally, the defendant might be facing
a harsh mandatory sentence and could rationally view a plea of guilty to

34. Id. at 1159. Just what forms of “exculpatory” evidence prosecutors are
constitutionally required to disclose prior to a guilty plea is a question left unsettled by
United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622 (2002), where the Court ruled that due process was
not violated where the government conditioned a fast-track plea offer on the defendant’s
waiver of her right to impeachment information. Id. at 633. Evidence supporting factual
innocence was not waived or alleged to have been withheld in Ruiz, so the Court did not
need to address whether a waiver of this most substantial form of exculpatory evidence
was enforceable or whether a plea of guilty in the face of its nondisclosure could later be
vacated. Id. at 631. Justice Thomas concurred only in the judgment, seeming to suggest
that because Brady v. Maryland was designed to protect a defendant’s right to a fair trial,
it may have no application whatsoever to a prosecutor’s discovery obligations prior to a
guilty plea. Id. at 633–34 (Thomas, J., concurring); see generally John G. Douglass,
Fatal Attraction? The Uneasy Courtship of Brady and Plea Bargaining, 50 EMORY L.J.
437 (2001).
35. Zacharias, supra note 33, at 1175–76; see Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining
Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2463, 2476 (2004).
36. See Fred C. Zacharias, Waiving Conflicts of Interest, 108 YALE L.J. 407, 414
(1998).
37. Of course, the prosecutors may encounter agency problems of their own with
respect to their representation of the state that may lead them to offer unduly lenient
sentence offers notwithstanding society’s interests in optimal deterrence. A prosecutor’s
goals might fail to be completely congruent with that of the principal when political or
career advancement concerns make the prosecutor unduly risk averse about the
possibilities of acquittal, or when issues of job satisfaction or desire for leisure time
cause the prosecutor to prefer a guilty plea to a more extended trial. See Stephen J.
Schulhofer, Plea Bargaining as Disaster, 101 YALE L.J. 1979, 1987–88 (1992).
38. Zacharias, supra note 36, at 414–15.
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a lesser offense—even one that the defendant did not commit—as
preferable to “rolling the dice” at trial.39
In Justice in Plea Bargaining, Zacharias wisely suggested that
prosecutors cannot possibly identify “just” conduct in the context of plea
bargaining without a clearer picture of what plea bargaining is supposed
to accomplish.40 Zacharias identified eight possible rationales for plea
bargaining: approximating trial results, allowing the prosecutor to take
equitable and mitigating factors into account, pursuing equalization
among defendants, empowering the participants, recognizing the
inevitable, saving resources, maximizing deterrence, and improving the
position of both parties.41 Discussing a series of deftly constructed
hypotheticals, Zacharias demonstrated how “applying different theories
of plea bargaining produces different conceptions of justice.”42
According to Zacharias, the profession cannot possibly ascertain what
justice means in the context of plea bargaining unless and until it decides
on the primary objective being pursued.43 Zacharias concluded that
prosecutors’ offices should identify ex ante the plea bargaining theory or
theories to which they ascribe so that individual prosecutors are not left
to impose their own individual views of justice on the defendant and the
public in an arbitrary and internally inconsistent way.44
The important insight of Zacharias’s 1998 article stems not so much
from the conclusions he reached—they were admittedly tentative45—but
from the challenge he presented. I would like to pick up where
Zacharias left off in identifying the state’s legitimate objectives during
plea bargaining in the hopes that this might help us shape a model of just
conduct for prosecutors. But first, my own feelings about justice and
plea bargaining differ from Zacharias’s in two very important respects.
First, I believe Zacharias’s eight possible theories of plea bargaining
conflated rationales for engaging in plea bargaining—as opposed to
insisting on public trials for resolving criminal disputes—with the
objectives that a prosecutor might properly seek to pursue during plea
bargaining once the prosecutor decides to engage in that process.
Inevitability, likely approximation of trial results and improving the
positions of both parties are apologias for the plea bargaining process
itself that clearly fall into the former category, while achieving equity in
individual cases and equality across multiple cases are objectives to be
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
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pursued during plea bargaining that clearly fall into the latter.46 I think
this is an important distinction because a prosecutor striving to do justice
within a plea bargaining milieu should be focusing primarily on the
results to be achieved rather than the reason the prosecutor agreed to
engage in the process in the first place.
Second, Zacharias suggested that electing a “primary theory” of plea
bargaining is a prerequisite to developing a coherent and nonarbitrary
model of justice.47 I am skeptical that a single coherent theory of plea
bargaining exists or can be agreed upon by any single prosecutorial
entity—not to mention the profession as a whole. Moreover, I think it is
possible to advance the dialogue about what it means to do justice in the
context of plea bargaining while recognizing that prosecutors have a
number of valid interests they are seeking to advance simultaneously, so
long as those interests are not inherently antagonistic. That is, the fact
that our disciplinary norms vest prosecutors with discretion to balance
priorities in the context of individual cases does not mean there are not
better (more just) and worse (unjust) outcomes that can flow from this
deliberative process. The key to ethical judgment is practical wisdom
or, what Aristotle termed, “phronesis.”48 This requires sensitivity to the
salient features of each particular situation and the ability to synthesize
thoughtfully the multiplicity of interests at stake.49
What is the “multiplicity of interests” at stake in plea bargaining? I
believe that a prosecutor’s primary objectives during plea bargaining
should be efficiency, equality, autonomy, and transparency. A thoughtful
balancing of these interests will approximate justice. Disregard for one
or more of these interests, or a failure to calibrate them properly in
individual cases, will result in injustice. First, I will define each of these
terms. Then I will identify two troublesome yet recurring situations that
arise in the plea bargaining setting that, in my view, violate a
prosecutor’s duty to do justice but are currently not prohibited by any
specific disciplinary rule. I will then try to demonstrate how a focus on
46. In my view, empowering the defendant, saving resources, and maximizing
deterrence might properly be viewed both as reasons to plea bargain and objectives to be
pursued within a plea bargaining setting.
47. Zacharias, supra note 33, at 1188.
48. ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS bk. VI, at 179–80 (Christopher Rowe trans.,
Oxford Univ. Press 2002) (c. 384 B.C.E.).
49. R. Michael Cassidy, Character and Context: What Virtue Theory Can Teach
Us About a Prosecutor’s Ethical Duty To “Seek Justice,” 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 635,
650–51 (2006).

101

efficiency, equality, autonomy, and transparency might help prosecutors
navigate these ethical minefields.
Efficiency. A prosecutor should be seeking in a plea agreement to
achieve the maximum amount of deterrent value at the lowest possible
cost to the state. That is, the prosecutor should (1) seek to assess the
likely sentence the defendant will face for the criminal conduct were the
defendant to be convicted following trial, and then (2) discount this
sentence by the risk of acquittal and the external costs to the state of
proceeding to trial, including threat to witness safety, privacy, fees for
experts, and so forth.50
Equality. A prosecutor should attempt to achieve horizontal equity
across cases and across time. That is, similarly situated defendants
should be treated similarly in terms of the deals they are offered.51 Exact
equality of circumstance is difficult to imagine—even with similarly
charged crimes—because defendants differ in their criminal records, and
crimes are committed with differing levels of impact on the community.
But the challenge here is for prosecutors to articulate differences that are
relevant and meaningful and disregard those that are not. For example, a
prosecutor should not offer a more lenient plea bargain to a defendant
than someone previously prosecuted for a similar crime because the
prosecutor is on more friendly terms with the defendant’s counsel or
because the prosecutor identifies in some reflexive way with the present
defendant’s personal background or circumstances. Simply put, a
prosecutor should not favor or disfavor one defendant over another on
any grounds that society is not prepared to say are relevant to the degree
of the defendant’s moral blameworthiness.
Autonomy. This theory of plea bargaining assumes that it is a good
thing for the defendant to participate in important decisions that affect
the defendant’s life.52 Plea bargaining allows a defendant to take
ownership and responsibility for the criminal conduct that led to the
indictment, and thus begin the process of rehabilitation and restorative
50. Under an efficiency rationale, a prosecutor would attempt to predict the likely
result after trial and discount it by the risk of acquittal and the external costs of litigation.
Predicting the sentence after trial allows a prosecutor to take into account the same
mitigating factors regarding the crime or the defendant’s background that the judge would be
able to consider at sentencing, or what Zacharias called “equitable” considerations.
Zacharias, supra note 33, at 1137 & n.43. The one outlier to this assumption is when the trial
judge has no sentencing discretion, and the prosecutor seeks through plea bargaining to
avoid the harsh impact of a mandatory sentence on equitable grounds, such as a “threestrikes-and-you-are-out” statute. Here I think that equity would be a consideration
independent of the four I identify above.
51. See Albert W. Alschuler, The Changing Plea Bargaining Debate, 69 CALIF. L.
REV. 652, 680 (1981) (arguing that a just sentence is one that treats defendants equally
with respect to their degrees of culpability).
52. Zacharias, supra note 33, at 1143.
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justice that are necessary to repair the harm and eventually reintegrate
the defendant into the community.53 The autonomy or “empowerment”54
model suggests that, when the defendant is able to participate
meaningfully in the process leading to the guilty plea and sentence, the
defendant will be more invested in the outcome, more likely to accept it
as legitimate, and more likely to benefit penologically from its terms.
Because this theory is premised on consent, it assumes that the
defendant’s decisions in the plea bargaining process are voluntary and
informed.
Transparency. Public criticism of plea bargaining seems to run the
gamut from a perception that the state sometimes steamrolls innocent
citizens to the perception that plea bargaining is a form of “bargainbasement justice” that lets the guilty off too lightly. If the public loses
faith in the fairness or legitimacy of plea bargaining, it undermines the
deterrent value of the criminal law. One of a prosecutor’s objectives
during plea bargaining thus should be to counter or eliminate the
perception of backroom politics. This has three implications. First, if a
prosecutorial entity has office policies with respect to plea bargaining,
for example, “charges carrying minimum-mandatory sentences will not
be reduced after indictment in the absence of the defendant’s agreement
to cooperate in the prosecution of others,” these policies should be in
writing and fairly accessible to the defense bar in order to create a level
Second, an individual prosecutor’s reasons for
playing field.55
recommending charging or sentencing concessions in specific cases
should be fully explained on the record at the time of the defendant’s
allocution unless special circumstances such as jeopardizing witness
53. See Stephen P. Garvey, Restorative Justice, Punishment, and Atonement, 2003
UTAH L. REV. 303, 313 (“The agreement into which the offender enters is only part of the
means to that greater end. Because reconciliation is its goal, restorative justice implicitly
recognizes that crime does more than cause harm: it damages the trust and equality that
ideally define the relationship existing among all citizens of a genuine political community.
The offender’s crime breached that trust and denied that equality. The repair of that
relationship is thus the real goal of restorative justice practices.”).
54. See Joseph Goldstein, For Harold Lasswell: Some Reflections on Human
Dignity, Entrapment, Informed Consent, and the Plea Bargain, 84 YALE L.J. 683, 699
(1975); see also George E. Dix, Waiver in Criminal Procedure: A Brief for More Careful
Analysis, 55 TEX. L. REV. 193, 219–21 (1977).
55. See A MERICAN L AW I NSTITUTE , A M ODEL C ODE OF P RE -ARRAIGNMENT
PROCEDURE § 350.3(2) (1975) (“Each prosecution office in the state shall issue
regulations pursuant to Section 10.3 setting forth guidelines and procedures with respect
to plea discussions and plea agreements designed to afford similarly situated defendants
equal opportunities for plea discussions and plea agreements.”).
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safety or compromising an ongoing sensitive investigation dictate that it
be done in camera. Third, any promises, rewards, or inducements the
prosecutor makes to the defendant in exchange for the defendant’s
cooperation against others should be reduced to writing to make future
Giglio56 disclosures more accurate.57
With these goals in mind, let me now examine two practices
sometimes undertaken by prosecutors during plea negotiations that in
my view are unethical⎯and here I use the term unethical to denote
moral deficiency. This will help us test the usefulness of the taxonomy
described above. The first scenario is threatening to prosecute a defendant’s
loved ones unless the defendant pleads guilty upon certain terms.
Neither the Model Rules of Professional Conduct nor the ABA Standards
for Criminal Justice: Prosecution Function prohibits such conduct.58
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has recognized that this practice is
fraught with danger,59 and several lower courts have ruled that “special
care” must be taken in such circumstances to ensure that the defendant’s
ultimate plea of guilty is not the product of coercion.60
56. Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154–55 (1972) (ruling that due process
requires the prosecutor to disclose to the defendant any “understanding or agreement”
made to its witnesses so that such material can be used to impeach the government
witness for bias on cross-examination).
57. See R. Michael Cassidy, “Soft Words of Hope:” Giglio, Accomplice Witnesses,
and the Problem of Implied Inducements, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 1129, 1172–73 (2004).
58. Although both the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct and the ABA
Criminal Justice Standards establish a threshold of probable cause to commence
criminal prosecution, neither addresses the circumstances under which a prosecutor may
threaten prosecution. Compare MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.8(a) (2010),
with ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND DEFENSE
FUNCTION Standard 3-3.9 (3d ed. 1993), available at http://www.abanet.org/crimjust/
standards/prosecutionfunction.pdf.
59. In Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364–65 (1978), the Supreme Court
ruled that it does not offend due process for a prosecutor to indict the defendant on
greater charges after the defendant rejects a plea agreement and elects to proceed to trial,
recognizing that “‘the imposition of these difficult choices [is] an inevitable’—and
permissible—‘attribute of any legitimate system which tolerates and encourages the
negotiation of pleas.’” Id. at 364 (quoting Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, 412 U.S. 17, 31
(1973)). Even in Bordenkircher, however, the Court stated that threatening the
prosecution or promising the nonprosecution of third parties “might pose a greater
danger of inducing a false guilty plea by skewing the assessment of the risks a defendant
must consider.” Id. at 364 n.8 (citing Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 758 (1970)).
Lower courts since Bordenkircher have found this danger to be at its apex when the third
party is related to the defendant. See cases cited infra note 60.
60. United States v. Carr, 80 F.3d 413, 417 (10th Cir. 1996); United States v.
Nuckols, 606 F.2d 566, 569 (5th Cir. 1979) (“Recognizing, however, that threats to
prosecute third persons can carry leverage wholly unrelated to the validity of the underlying
charge, we think that prosecutors who choose to use that technique must observe a high
standard of good faith. Indeed, absent probable cause to believe that the third person has
committed a crime, offering ‘concessions’ as to him or her constitutes a species of
fraud.”); see also State v. Danh, 516 N.W.2d. 539, 542 (Minn. 1994).
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Threatening family members and loved ones to leverage a guilty plea
seems improper to me, for at least two reasons. First, it represents a
degree of coercion that implicates the autonomy of the defendant and the
exercise of the defendant’s true volition.61 Forcing a defendant to
choose between the constitutional right to a trial and the desire to protect
a loved one impresses me as a cruel and abusive exercise of the state’s
power—the presentation of a “Sophie’s Choice,”62 as it were. Moreover,
it implicates the goal of equality. If the government is morally justified
in using such leverage, it will necessarily be in a stronger plea
bargaining position with respect to defendants who choose to participate
in crimes with family members than it will be with defendants who
choose to participate in crimes with unrelated coconspirators. No
legitimate goal of the criminal law is advanced when the former
category of offender faces a greater certainty or degree of punishment
than the latter.
A second troublesome practice occurs when a prosecutor includes an
explicit provision in a plea agreement whereby the defendant waives the
right to later challenge the conviction on the grounds that the defendant
was deprived of the Sixth Amendment right to the effective
representation of counsel during the proceedings. Prosecutors seem to
be going “waiver crazy” these days, trying to insulate all plea
agreements from collateral attack on any grounds in order to achieve
finality to the criminal process.63 Emboldened by Ruiz and the tendency
of courts to view plea agreements primarily thought the lens of
contract,64 prosecutors now routinely include in their standard plea
61. The American Bar Association suggests that in connection with plea negotiations, a
prosecutor “should not bring or threaten to bring charges against the defendant or
another person, or refuse to dismiss such charges, where admissible evidence does not
exist to support the charges or the prosecuting attorney has no good faith intention of
pursuing those charges.” ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PLEAS OF GUILTY
Standard 14-3.1(h) (3d ed. 1999) (emphasis added), available at http://www.abanet.org/
crimjust/standards/pleasofguilty.pdf. The commentary to this standard states that such
“deliberately coercive prosecutorial conduct in plea negotiations undermines the fairness of
guilty pleas.” Id. Standard 14-3.1(h) cmt.
62. See generally WILLIAM STYRON, SOPHIE’S CHOICE (1979).
63. See Daniel P. Blank, Plea Bargaining Waivers Reconsidered: A Legal
Pragmatist’s Guide to Loss, Abandonment and Alienation, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 2011,
2013 (2000) (noting that plea agreement waivers seem to have “multiplied without limit”);
Nancy J. King & Michael E. O’Neill, Appeal Waivers and the Future of Sentencing
Policy, 55 DUKE L.J. 209, 246 (2005) (discussing frequency of certain forms of waiver in
a sample of 971 completed federal plea agreements).
64. See United States v. Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. 196, 208 (1995).
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agreements waiver of the right to appeal the court-imposed sentence;
waiver of the right to challenge the conviction or sentence through
collateral attack, such as by habeas petition;65 waiver of statutory rights,
such as the Speedy Trial Act;66 waiver of the right to contest asset
forfeiture; waiver of the right to contest deportation; and so forth. The
emerging trend seems to be “let’s throw every possible waiver”⎯
including a waiver to the kitchen sink⎯into a plea agreement and see
what will stick. The practice is becoming so common in federal courts
that the ABA Standards Committee is considering amending the
Criminal Justice Standards: Prosecution Function to discourage certain
waivers in plea agreements.67
The most troublesome of these waivers is a waiver of the right to the
effective assistance of counsel. The case law in the federal circuits on
whether an appeal waiver can bar a subsequent claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel is conflicting. Some circuits will enforce any
waiver that is knowing and voluntary, unless such enforcement would
result in a “miscarriage of justice.”68 Other circuits have carved out an
express exception to the category of valid waivers for ineffective
assistance of counsel claims,69 and still others have ruled that an appeals
waiver will bar a subsequent challenge on ineffective counsel grounds if
it relates to the quality of the representation leading up to the plea or

A sounder way to encourage settlement is to permit the interested parties to
enter into knowing and voluntary negotiations without any arbitrary limits on their
bargaining chips. To use the Ninth Circuit’s metaphor, if the prosecutor is
interested in “buying” the reliability assurance that accompanies a waiver agreement,
then precluding waiver can only stifle the market for plea bargains. A defendant
can “maximize” what he has to “sell” only if he is permitted to offer what the
prosecutor is most interested in buying.
Id.
65.
66.
67.

See 18 U.S.C. § 2255 (2006 & Supp. 2009).
18 U.S.C. § 3161 (2006).
See PROPOSED STANDARD 3-5.9: WAIVER OF RIGHTS AS CONDITION OF PLEA
AGREEMENT (June 2010) (on file with author).
(b) A prosecutor should not routinely require plea waivers of post-conviction
claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, prosecutorial misconduct, or destruction
of evidence unknown to the defendant at the time of the guilty plea. The prosecutor
may seek and accept such waivers on an individualized basis if knowing and
voluntary. No waiver should be accepted without an exception for manifest
injustice including actual innocence based on newly discovered evidence.
Id.
68. United States v. Gwinnett, 483 F.3d 200, 203 (3d Cir. 2007); United States v.
Teeter, 257 F.3d 14, 25–26 (1st Cir. 2001).
69. See, e.g., United States v. Rhodes, 330 F.3d 949, 952 (7th Cir. 2003); United
States v. Pruitt, 32 F.3d 431, 433 (9th Cir. 1994).
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during sentencing, but not if it alleges constitutionally substandard
performance that directly tainted the waiver itself.70
Regardless of whether a reviewing court will enforce a general waiver
of appellate rights in the face of a subsequent claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel, the ethical question is whether a prosecutor should
draft a plea agreement that expressly and specifically waives ineffective
counsel claims. This is a question of important consequence because
although a reviewing court might be willing to entertain a later claim of
ineffective assistance under the strictest “miscarriage of justice”
exception to waiver, some convicted defendants might be deterred from
bringing even the most meritorious of such challenges in the face of a
written instrument specifically barring it.
Bar ethics committees in five states have ruled that defense counsel
may not ethically counsel clients to sign a plea agreement containing an
express waiver of ineffective assistance of counsel claims, either because
defense counsel is inherently conflicted on that subject,71 or because
such a waiver is the functional equivalent of prospectively limiting the
lawyer’s liability to the client for malpractice in violation of the state’s

70. See Parisi v. United States, 529 F.3d 134, 138–39 (2d Cir. 2008) (noting that a
challenge to the process by which defendant entered into agreement containing waiver
was not barred, but a challenge to other ineffective conduct by attorney leading up to
plea could be barred); United States v. White, 307 F.3d 336, 343 (5th Cir. 2002) (“[A]n
ineffective assistance of counsel argument survives a waiver of appeal only when the
claimed assistance directly affected the validity of that waiver or the plea itself.”).
71. See, e.g., Advisory Comm. of the Supreme Court of Mo., Formal Opinion 126:
Waiver of Post-Conviction Relief (2009), http://www.mobar.org/formal/formal-126.doc
(interpreting Missouri disciplinary rule 4-1.7(b)(1), the state analogue to Model Rule
1.7); Tex. Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Opinion No. 571 (2006) (interpreting Texas
Disciplinary Rule 1.06, the state analogue to Model Rule 1.7), reprinted in TEX. B.J.,
Jan. 2006, at 790, 790–93. Under Model Rule 1.7, a concurrent conflict of interest exists
when there is a significant risk that the representation will be materially limited by the
“personal interest of the lawyer.” MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.7(a)(2)
(2010). A future judicial finding of ineffective assistance is against the lawyer’s
personal interests not only because it could damage the lawyer’s professional reputation
but also because it could lead to disciplinary action against the lawyer under Model Rule
1.1. Id. R. 1.1 (“A lawyer shall provide competent representation to a client.”). A
lawyer may proceed in the face of such a concurrent conflict only if (1) the lawyer
reasonably believes that he will be able to provide competent and diligent representation,
(2) the representation is not prohibited by law, and (3) the client gives informed consent,
confirmed in writing. Id. R. 1.7(b). If any of these three requirements are not met, the
client must be advised by separate counsel with respect to that aspect of the plea
agreement.
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equivalent to Model Rule 1.8(h),72 or on both grounds.73 The Ethics
Advisory Committee of the National Association of Criminal Defense
Attorneys has issued a similar advisory.74 If these ethical opinions are
correct, a prosecutor should not be drafting ineffective waivers because
the defense attorney should not be signing ineffective waivers.75 After
all, it is improper for a prosecutor to encourage defense counsel to
engage in any conduct that may violate the applicable rules of
professional responsibility.76
Insisting on so-called ineffective counsel waivers impresses me as
overreaching of the worst sort and fundamentally inconsistent with a
prosecutor’s obligation as a minister of justice. As in my first
hypothetical, it places efficiency at a substantially higher level of
priority during the plea bargaining process than autonomy and equality.
When defense counsel may have failed to conduct even the barest
threshold of investigation or preparation of a client’s case or when
defense counsel has an undisclosed conflict of interest due to a secret
representation of an unindicted third party, the voluntariness of the
defendant’s plea is called into serious question. Especially considering
how high a bar the Supreme Court has set to establish a Sixth
Amendment violation,77 constitutionally defective representation strikes
at the core of the defendant’s ability to choose freely the options
presented.
72. Ohio Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances and Discipline, Op. 2001-6 (2001),
available at http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/Boards/BOC/Advisory_Opinions/2001//
op%2001-006.doc; Tenn. Bd. of Prof’l Responsibility, Advisory Ethics Op. 1994-A-549
(1994); Vt. Bar Ass’n, Advisory Ethics Op. 95-04 (1995), available at https://www.
vtbar.org/intus/cms/Display_Page.asp?PageID=5 (follow “Advisory Ethic Opinions” hyperlink;
then follow “Plea Bargains” hyperlink). One state, Arizona, has rejected the analogy between
ineffective assistance of counsel claims and malpractice claims for purposes of the
prospective limitation of liability prohibition in Model Rule 1.8(h). Ariz. State Bar
Comm. on the Rules of Prof’l Conduct, Op. 95-08 (1995), available at http://www.
myazbar.org/Ethics/opinionview.cfm?id=460.
73. N.C. State Bar, Ethics Op. RPC 129 (1993), available at http://www.ncbar.
gov/ethics/index.asp (select number “RPC 129”; then follow “View Opinion” hyperlink).
74. Nat’l Ass’n of Criminal Def. Lawyers Ethics Advisory Comm., Proposed
Formal Op. 03-02 (2003), available at http://www.nacdl.org/public.nsf/2cdd02b415ea3a6
4852566d6000daa79/ethicsopinions/$FILE/op03-02.pdf.
75. Douglas A. Morris, Waiving an Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claim: An
Ethical Conundrum, CHAMPION, Dec. 2003, at 34, 35–36 (2003).
76. Model Rule 8.4(a) provides that it is professional misconduct for a lawyer to
“knowingly assist or induce” another lawyer to violate the disciplinary rules. MODEL
RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.4(a) (2010). When a prosecutor drafts and encourages a
defense attorney to execute an appeal waiver that purports to waive ineffective assistance
claims, that prosecutor is essentially abetting a violation of Model Rule 1.8(h). See id. R.
1.8(h); see also id. R. 8.4(d) (requiring that a lawyer shall not “engage in conduct that is
prejudicial to the administration of justice”).
77. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984) (crafting a two-prong test
for ineffective claims under the Sixth Amendment).
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Ineffective counsel waivers also jeopardize the equal treatment of
similarly situated defendants. Instead of inspiring defense counsel to
expend their best possible efforts on behalf of a client, an express waiver
of ineffective assistance claims signals to the defense bar that they need
not worry about substandard performance when their clients intend to
plead guilty. This has the potential of heightening the disparity in charging
and sentencing treatment between defendants based on the quality of
their representation rather than based on the nature and extent of their
criminal acts. In a system where approximately ninety-five percent of
criminal cases are resolved by guilty plea,78 such a governmentinduced disincentive to quality representation simply should not be
tolerated. Even in Mezzanatto—perhaps the high-water mark of the
Supreme Court’s treatment of plea agreement as contract—the Court
recognized that “[t]here may be some . . . provisions that are so fundamental
to the reliability of the factfinding process that they may never be
waived without irreparably ‘discredit[ing] the federal courts.’”79
The enactment of more explicit disciplinary rules detailing a
prosecutor’s ethical responsibilities during plea bargaining is unlikely.
As Fred Zacharias so prudently recognized throughout his distinguished
career, there are “inherent limitations on what ethics rules and the
disciplinary process can accomplish.”80 Nonetheless, because many
prosecutors and courts now tend to view plea bargaining only through
the lens of contract law, encouraging prosecutors to recognize that the
do-justice mandate of rule 3.8 applies to plea bargaining and is more
than a hortatory ideal is important.
Interpreting the general exhortation to do justice in light of the four
critical plea bargaining objectives I identified above will have several
salutary effects. First, it will encourage prosecutors to be more
introspective about their roles and more thoughtful about their choices.
Second, it will provide them with some context to order the
government’s priorities in individual cases. Third, it might guide them
toward more consistent and less arbitrary plea bargaining practices

78.
79.

See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
United States v. Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. 196, 204 (1995) (citing 21 WRIGHT &
GRAHAM, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 5039 (1977)); see also United States v.
Melancon, 972 F.2d 566, 575–78 (5th Cir. 1992) (Parker, J., concurring) (arguing that
courts should take systemic goals and integrity of the courts into account in determining
whether to accept waivers in plea agreements).
80. Zacharias & Green, supra note 3, at 58.
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across the multitude of cases they will handle throughout their careers.
And finally, as Fred Zacharias himself recognized, putting some flesh on
the do-justice admonition may help focus the professional training of
prosecutors and the development of coherent office policies within
prosecutorial units.81

81.
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Zacharias, supra note 33, at 1186–87.

